标哥做过几期揭露加盟商套路的视频，他最终得出的结论是：24年往后，量贩零食行业稳赚不赔的，不是零食生意，不是加盟商，只有品牌方。

1、亚美登录 谈及此事，他表示球队必须像享受胜利时一样，体面地接受失败。

阿莱格里离任后，米兰在教练人选上的头号目标是伊劳拉，不过早在几个月前，水晶宫就已经与伊劳拉开启了谈判，西班牙人对执教米兰兴趣不大。亚美登录分业务来看，谷歌的营收可以分为谷歌服务、谷歌云和新业务三大部分。

2、美沙核协议引发以色列战略焦虑，美以分歧扩大

对此，北交所问询要求公司说明关联方资金拆借相关内控运行有效性。

3、盘锦香料搭乘数字通道“直飞”荷兰

它也曾被专利悬崖逼到绝境，百忧解、再普乐、欣百达专利接连到期，营收断崖式下跌。

4、7.7世界杯推荐：阿根廷vs埃及

厂家把质保期定在缺陷大规模暴露之前，把风险转移给了高频使用的营运车主。

5、以总理透露说服特朗普打伊朗细节：带7张幻灯片当面展示

如今特罗萨德已离队加盟贝西克塔斯，阿森纳左路留下空缺，阿尔特塔急需补强。

如今，作为马拉多纳的传承者，梅西将迎来个人第206场国家队比赛，也是他职业生涯首次对阵英格兰。

所以，这轮交付量回升带有明显的「以价换量」痕迹。

6、女人不管多大年纪，都可以准备一条格纹裙，大方优雅又复古

把两种任务放在同一套资源里运行，容易出现资源闲置或排队，拆开之后，集群可以围绕不同负载进行更细致的配置。

彭博社当天报道，在美国股市下跌前，Kimi K3发布，性能有望与OpenAI和Anthropic最强大的产品相媲美。

7、欧冠疯狂1夜：马竞2-0巴萨，大巴黎2-0利物浦，小蜘蛛杜埃世界波

西班牙在半决赛中给法国队好好上了一课。

不过，好消息是球队迎来了八九成状态的罗德里，他在中场的调度和拦截依然是球队攻防转换的枢纽。

8、血沉：你的健康预警项目！怎么降下来？

27岁的法国中卫马朗·萨尔在与朗斯合同到期后成为自由身，包括皇家社会在内的多家欧洲球队都对他有意，皇家社会甚至希望用他来补强后防。

尽管比利时队在上半场结束前由德凯特拉雷头球扳平比分，但西班牙队并未慌乱。

他们的婉拒很能说明问题：现阶段的米兰，既拿不出清晰的中长期竞技规划去说服候选人，也无法在薪酬和话语权上给出压倒性的保证。

9、@每一位家长和孩子，查收暑假安全提示

一个多月的时间里，来自各大洲的球员迎来职业生涯中难得的机遇。

（文｜出海参考，作者｜王璐，编辑｜罗文琴）Nextfin News — On July 22, latest research from Omdia showed that despite total market shipments dropping by over ten percent in the second quarter, Vivo—excluding its iQOO sub-brand—maintained its top position in the Indian smartphone market with 6.3 million units shipped. Yet despite its strength in the market, Vivo was unable to keep full control over its manufacturing plants in India. There is an unwritten law in the corporate world that market share acts as a moat and scale brings bargaining power. But in India, Vivo has just seen that principle turned on its head—and in a remarkably brutal fashion. On July 9, an official approval was finally granted. Dixon Technologies announced to the stock exchange that Vivo India received a clearance letter issued on July 8 by India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Under this approval, the manufacturing operations Vivo built over twelve years in India will formally be folded into a joint venture controlled fifty-one percent by a local partner. According to industry analyses, the new entity has a paid-up capital of just fifty million rupees—around three and a half million yuan—yet it is taking over a mega-factory designed for an annual capacity of over one hundred million units and backed by a workforce of more than ten thousand employees. Viewed in isolation, this transaction reads like a story of loss. But when placed back into the context of Vivo’s global footprint, its true nature changes entirely. India remains Vivo’s largest overseas market, ranking first in 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, accounting for roughly one-third of the brand's total global volume. Overseas operations already contribute more than half of Vivo's global revenue, with targets set to raise that share to sixty percent this year and seventy percent by 2027. This shift in India does not merely affect a single regional market; it alters the structural load-bearing pillar of Vivo’s entire global strategy. With the Indian chapter coming to a close, Vivo now faces far more practical questions about its future: What exactly did this equity restructuring change, and how will the brand navigate its next phase of globalization? A Three-and-a-Half-Million Yuan Outlay for a Three-Hundred-Billion Revenue Business By securing a fifty-one percent controlling stake, Dixon leveraged its position to capture a cash cow with an annual revenue potential estimated between two hundred fifty billion and three hundred billion rupees—roughly twenty-one billion to twenty-five billion yuan. This revenue guidance originates directly from Dixon’s own management team. As early as May, Dixon founder Sunil Vachani revealed that the joint venture would handle approximately two-thirds of Vivo’s smartphone sales in India, representing over twenty million units annually. JPMorgan further projects that the joint venture will add around eleven million smartphone shipments in fiscal year 2027, scaling up to approximately twenty-two million units annually across fiscal years 2028 and 2029. From India's perspective, this outcome represents a decisive policy victory. Looking back at Vivo’s expansion abroad, its capital deployment in India consisted of substantial physical investments. According to an official press release issued by Vivo India in April 2023, the company outlined a total investment plan of seventy-five billion rupees. The first phase called for thirty-five billion rupees by the end of 2023, of which twenty-four billion had already been allocated alongside plans to inject an additional eleven billion rupees by year-end. The new facility in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, spans roughly 169 acres—a site acquired back in 2018 that officially went into operation in mid-2024. It currently holds an annual production capacity of sixty million units, with plans to double that figure to one hundred twenty million upon full completion, rivaling the footprint of Samsung’s largest manufacturing plant in the country. By 2018, Vivo's earlier facility was already generating a monthly output of around one million units while employing nearly ten thousand local workers. What do these figures truly signify? They demonstrate that Vivo was never just a consumer brand in India; it had built an end-to-end manufacturing system, a local supply chain, and a massive employment ecosystem. The company replicated its battle-tested Chinese ground-sales model across India, extending from major metropolitan shopping centers down to rural retail shops across roughly seventy thousand touchpoints. It even transformed India into an export hub, shipping Indian-made smartphones to Thailand and Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2022, with export targets exceeding one million units in 2023. Yet after 2024, every one of these capital investments transformed into a distinct disadvantage at the negotiating table. Faced with mounting regulatory pressure, Vivo initiated discussions in 2024 with major domestic players including Tata Group, Murugappa Group, and Dixon Technologies to explore joint ventures or contract manufacturing options, though early negotiations stalled. In December 2024, Vivo signed a non-binding term sheet with Dixon Technologies, initiating a protracted government approval process that dragged on for nineteen months. Upon closing, the joint venture will purchase selected manufacturing assets from Vivo for an undisclosed amount, sign dedicated production and packaging agreements with Vivo India, handle a substantial share of its OEM orders, and retain the flexibility to manufacture for third-party brands down the line. With an initial capital commitment of just 25.5 million rupees, Dixon gains access to established assembly lines, skilled workers, an integrated supply chain, and guaranteed orders from a brand selling over thirty million phones a year. In return, Vivo retains only the right to continue selling smartphones in the Indian market alongside a forty-nine percent financial yield on equity. Using a newly incorporated entity with a registered capital of merely fifty million rupees to take control of an advanced industrial plant capable of producing over one hundred million units annually is virtually unprecedented in global business history. Vivo understood the gravity of the concessions, but faced with severe regulatory constraints, it was left with few alternatives. Why Did Stronger Sales Lead to Heavier Constraints? Under standard market conditions, Vivo’s operational execution in India was textbook perfect. According to data from market research firm Omdia, Vivo—excluding iQOO—led the Indian smartphone market throughout 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, marking a nineteen percent year-over-year growth rate. Samsung trailed in second place with twenty-three million units and a fifteen percent share. By the fourth quarter, Vivo widened its lead even further, shipping 7.9 million units in a single quarter to capture twenty-three percent of the market. Securing the top spot in the world's second-largest smartphone market—a region absorbing roughly one hundred fifty-four million devices annually—should have been a landmark corporate victory after twelve years of dedicated effort. However, as policy priorities shifted unexpectedly, the very capital-heavy assets Vivo spent years building transformed into immobilized leverage against the company. In April 2020, India enacted Press Note 3, requiring case-by-case government review for all direct foreign investments originating from countries sharing a land border. This rule effectively blocked capital injection channels for Chinese entities. Over the following years, regulatory scrutiny targeting Chinese smartphone manufacturers steadily intensified. In July 2022, authorities accused Vivo India of illicitly remitting 624.76 billion rupees back to China under the guise of tax avoidance. Vivo was hardly the only brand reshaped by this changing regulatory framework. Enforcement agencies froze 55.51 billion rupees of Xiaomi India’s assets in a dispute that remains unresolved; OPPO received a customs tax demand totaling 43.89 billion rupees; Transsion's manufacturing subsidiary, Ismartu India, surrendered a 50.1 percent controlling stake to Dixon; and HKC’s joint venture with Dixon was approved under a seventy-four to twenty-six equity structure. Faced with these conditions, Vivo was forced into a harsh binary choice: abandon its sunk costs and hand over billions of rupees in physical plants and distribution networks, or accept majority control by a local partner in exchange for permission to remain in the market. The restructuring struck directly at the primary engine of Vivo’s international business. India is not just another regional market for Vivo; it is its largest overseas pillar. In March of last year during the Boao Forum for Asia, Vivo COO Hu Baishan emphasized two key realities to Bloomberg: India is Vivo's most critical international market, and with overseas sales contributing over half of total revenues, the company is aiming for sixty percent in 2026 and seventy percent by 2027. In essence, the restructuring in India does not just adjust a local subsidiary; it alters the foundational premise of Vivo’s global expansion story. The "deep localization" playbook—building local plants, hiring local workforces, and cultivating local component ecosystems—long viewed as an ideal blueprint for overseas expansion, saw its ownership structure unilaterally rewritten in its most prominent market. Without Direct Plant Ownership in India, How Will Vivo Secure One-Third of Its Global Footprint? From a strategic standpoint, Vivo officially characterizes its international methodology as "More Local, More Global." The strategy relies on manufacturing localization through plants in markets like India and Brazil; marketing localization via major cultural partnerships ranging from the Indian Premier League to official sponsorships at the UEFA European Championship; and channel localization by exporting its field-sales distribution networks. The effectiveness of this approach is undeniable, as evidenced by Vivo holding the top market position in both India and Indonesia. Yet Vivo’s challenges in India expose the inherent vulnerabilities of this model: an over-concentration in specific regional markets and the property-rights risk associated with capital-heavy physical infrastructure. Pushing "More Local" to its logical extreme means anchoring factories, workforces, and supply chain assets entirely within foreign legal jurisdictions. Under favorable conditions, these assets form competitive barriers; during regulatory shifts, they turn into operational exposure. The deeper Vivo planted its roots in India over twelve years, the less leverage it retained during structural negotiations. Another challenge lies in Vivo's limited footprint across premium segments and developed Western markets. In discussions with Bloomberg, Hu Baishan noted that Vivo has paused expansion into developed regions like the United States and Western Europe, where carrier channels and Apple hold dominant positions, preferring instead to consider entering via new product categories over a three-to-five-year horizon. In India, the focus shifts toward expanding presence in the premium segment above six hundred dollars. In short, Vivo’s international expansion remains focused primarily on mid-to-entry segments across emerging markets, offering thinner profit margins. A six percent decline in Southeast Asian regional shipments in 2025 serves as a clear reminder of these market dynamics. So where does the company go from here? Part of the answer is already visible in Vivo’s recent strategic adjustments. First, Vivo is reframing its presence in India, shifting from a direct asset-owning manufacturer to a brand, technology, and distribution coordinator. This setup preserves market share, protects cash flow, maintains a forty-nine percent financial yield, and allows its premium product plans to proceed as intended. This structural pivot is not mere external speculation; it is explicitly defined by the mechanics of the joint venture agreement. According to regulatory filings submitted by Dixon, the joint venture is mandated to carry out three specific operational functions: acquire selected manufacturing assets from Vivo, execute contract manufacturing and packaging agreements with Vivo India, and fulfill OEM orders—initially covering roughly two-thirds of Vivo’s local sales volume before opening up capacity to third-party brands. In other words, the joint venture functions as a contract manufacturer, while product R&D, branding, pricing strategy, and retail distribution remain controlled by Vivo India. Holding a forty-nine percent equity stake, Vivo transitions to an equity accounting model rather than full revenue consolidation while retaining proportional board representation to safeguard its governance voice. Simply put: manufacturing operations transfer to a locally controlled partner, while the commercial brand and retail business remain firmly in Vivo's hands. Maintaining market leadership, preserving operational cash flow, and collecting a forty-nine percent share of manufacturing profits represents a practical compromise designed to minimize disruption. Second, Vivo is actively establishing a multi-hub manufacturing and brand strategy. In late May 2025, Vivo launched its product line in São Paulo, Brazil, under the Jovi sub-brand name. Because the "Vivo" trademark was already registered by local telecom operator Telefônica, the company adapted by entering under an alternate brand identity. Manufacturing was assigned to a local partner, GBR, with production lines established in the Manaus Free Trade Zone that went operational in January 2025. Complemented by established market positions in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Latin America is emerging as Vivo's next core strategic region. The Brazilian operating model serves as a template tailored for the post-India era: brand names can adapt, manufacturing can be outsourced to regional assembly partners, and market entry moves forward without exposing heavy physical assets to single-jurisdiction legal risk. The experience in India delivers a clear lesson on corporate asset ownership: deep operational localization alone is no longer an absolute defense, making governance structure and geographic diversification essential indicators of long-term resilience.7月24日，旭阳新材IPO即将上会。

10、抗美援朝打了三年，彭德怀只指挥了一年半，剩下的仗谁在打？_网易订阅

英格兰人与米兰的合同截止到2027年，到现在续约还没有任何进展。

朗尼克希望能够掌控俱乐部的全部足球事务，建立一个以他为核心的管理体系，带来自己的完整团队。

1、比亚迪唐换代，差不多的样子和尺寸，但比大唐便宜？

当四叉戟的锋芒在赛场上尽情绽放，我们有理由相信，这支兼具天赋、经验与战术素养的球队，将在2026年的夏天，向着队史第三座世界杯冠军发起最有力的冲击。

2、时隔168天！北京国安再遇河南队，票务公告发布，瞄准主场第3胜

不堆算力，用存储扩展显存 事实上，无论是消费级的RTX 5090还是数据中心的B300，都同样面临"内存墙"带来的制约。

3、最深入人心的“刘姥姥”，走了

阿根廷队由此逐渐接管比赛，并最终由恩佐·费尔南德斯扳平比分。一场5-0，让法布雷加斯豪取5连胜！意甲最新积分榜：2-4名仅差6分巴萨官方今日确认，弗朗基·德容右膝内侧副韧带撕裂，将缺阵五到六个月。

4、KeyBanc上调Ameren与Duke Energy评级，称数据中心的负荷增长将提振盈利

一些敏锐的地方政府已经开始改变玩法，不再承诺直接给几千万元的股权投资，而是改给“绿电额度”“免费算力支持”“精准供应链对接”以及“厂房租金极度优惠”。

5、在欢迎晚宴上，特朗普罕见破例了！

许多基金规模只有两三千万，除了投了一两个当地的“关系户”项目，或者干脆空转吃管理费外，毫无效率可言。

6、新世代宝马X5首发，首次集齐5种动力，但取消了天地门

阿莫林3-4-2-1的核心逻辑是，三中卫不能只会防守，必须具备从中路直接破解第一道压迫线的传球能力；两名翼卫需要同时拥有顶级往返能力和一对一爆破力，进攻端能顶到边锋位，防守端第一时间回撤补位。

值得一提的是，这2个月的时间里，争四集团的对手都在秀，只有米兰在挨揍。

今年7月，苹果“Apple智能”完成网信办备案，联合阿里、百度分别承接长文本生成、本土化搜索服务，整套AI能力将首发搭载于iPhone 18 Pro。

7、成耀东当选2026怡宝中乙联赛5月最佳教练员

主教练雅金为球队打造了4-2-3-1的成熟体系，防守端全员回撤压缩空间，进攻端依靠扎卡的长传调度和边路快速突击制造威胁。

主要原因是伊劳拉得到了一份在经济层面更具吸引力的提议，那就是执教刚刚斩获欧协联冠军并闯入下赛季欧联杯的水晶宫。

8、2年1300万美元！火箭官方宣布签约斯马特 昔日DPOY加盟休城

不过，考虑到此次事件发生在世界杯半决赛，且对手是英格兰，性质更为严重，罚款的金额可能会高于2014年的标准。

最要警惕的是押金和培训贷。

在极佳视界的设想中，如果汽车能够在模型里预演一次转向，那么机器人也应该在搬运箱子前，判断怎样伸手成功率更高。

在2026年美加墨世界杯的赛场上，他不仅没有老去，反而用一份令人窒息的数据榜单，向全世界宣告了何为真正的“降维打击”。